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1. Introduction
The “Greenback Era” (1862-1878) in U.S. financial history is a source of continued fascination among economists.
This period is marked by the first time since the War of Independence when paper notes served as legal tender currency,
the first time ever when the federal government levied personal income taxes, and the first time when the system of
national banks that has survived in a modified form until today came into existence.1 Lessons of the Greenback Era
are particularly informative from an empirical perspective, since the wealth of available data (e.g., Mitchell, 1908;
Macaulay, 1938) allows for rigorous testing of economic theories.
This paper reinvestigates one of the most stunning phenomena of the Greenback Era, which is commonly known
as “the paradox of interest rates.” Different from the existing literature, the paper analyzes the behavior of short-term
money market returns rather than long-term bond yields, focusing explicitly on whether the money market admitted
arbitrage opportunities. While the “no arbitrage” assumption is customary in the analysis of present-day financial
markets, its applicability to American markets of the nineteenth century remains a hotly debated issue. This paper is
the first one to empirically address the topic of market efficiency in the context of the money market rather than to
perform an analysis of the gold market efficiency, which has been done – and redone – many times in the literature.
Knowledge of whether financial markets admitted arbitrage opportunities is crucial for determining which of the two
leading explanations of the paradox – the resumption expectations model of Calomiris (1988) or the capital flow
argument of Friedman and Schwartz (1963) – is more plausible. The paper has other novel aspects. Most notably,
it analyzes whether the money market systematically admitted arbitrage by applying tools of modern asset pricing
theory. Also, it utilizes rich return data, a part of which appears to have been overlooked in the prior research.
The paradox of low nominal interest rates during rampant inflation in the Civil War North had long been known to
economic historians (e.g., Mitchell, 1903, pp. 367-368).2 A counterintuitive behavior of the rates becomes even more
puzzling when one considers the Greenback Era as a whole. Figure 1 shows that the monthly wholesale price index in
the U.S., which is believed to be the most reliable price index for the period (Kindahl, 1961, p. 34), more than doubled
∗Telephone: 1-515-294-6311, fax: 1-515-294-6644.
Email address: oz9a@iastate.edu (Oleksandr Zhylyevskyy)
1For a comprehensive account of historical events and experiences of the U.S. economy during the Greenback Era interested readers are referred
to Mitchell (1903), Dewey (1939), Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Studenski and Krooss (1963), and Thompson (1985).
2Lerner (1954) and Davis and Pecquet (1990) study a similarly puzzling behavior of interest rates in the Civil War South.
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in the course of the Civil War. Afterwards, the index gradually declined and returned to its prewar levels in the late
1870s. On average, the annual inflation rate during the Civil War exceeded 25%. Then, between 1866 and 1878, the
country experienced prolonged deflation at the average annual rate of more than 6%. If money market participants
had correctly anticipated the price dynamics during the Greenback Era, one would expect to observe high nominal
interest rates between 1862 and 1865 and low rates afterwards, in line with the textbook Fisher equation, i = r + pie,
where i and r are the nominal and real interest rate, respectively, and pie is the expected inflation rate.
However, the actual pattern of the money market rates is strikingly different. Figure 2 plots monthly averages of
annualized commercial paper rates in New York City, which represent nominal rates on 60 to 90-day uncollateralized
loans made to businesses with good or excellent credit histories. Other money market rates (not shown in the figure)
such as the New York collateralized call loan rate and the Boston first-class bankable paper rate exhibit a similar
pattern. Between 1862 and 1865, the nominal commercial paper rate fluctuated between 4.5% and 9.2%, with the
average rate of 6.5% being well below the annual inflation rate of 25%. Between 1866 and the Panic of 1873, the
average commercial paper rate increased to 8%,3 despite concurrent deflation at the average annual rate of 5.6%.
During the recessionary years of 1874 to 1878, the average commercial paper rate declined to 5.3%, while deflation
accelerated to 7.8%.
Succinctly put, between 1862 and 1865, the ex post real money market rates were negative and large in absolute
magnitude, while between 1866 and 1878, they were positive and large. In the latter case, it is doubtful that real
rates in excess of 13% were entirely due to a risk premium, because the premium on the money market instruments
had to be at least 8%, assuming a risk-free return of 5%.4 Such a high risk premium is only characteristic of much
riskier equity securities. The essence of the paradox is that large negative real returns until 1865 and large positive
real returns afterwards persisted for several years, which implies that each case is likely an outcome of a money
market equilibrium. From the standpoint of the rational expectations theory, these equilibria may seem strange, as
they indicate that inflationary expectations were out of line with the actual price dynamics for prolonged periods of
time.
Understandably, the original explanation of the paradox is that investors had erroneous inflationary expectations
(Mitchell, 1903, pp. 369-370). However, Mitchell qualifies his claim by stating that this explanation, while potentially
correct, is insufficient and that the low nominal rates during the Civil War might, in fact, have resulted from a weak
bargaining power of lenders and diminished demand for credit (Mitchell, 1903, p. 375).
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) offer a distinctly different explanation, which presupposes arbitrage opportunities
(Roll, 1972, p. 494). In their view, the pattern of the interest rates can be attributed to speculative capital flows. For
example, the low nominal rates during the Civil War may have resulted from a massive capital inflow from abroad,
as foreign investors took advantage of buying cheap (in terms of gold) greenback-denominated assets in anticipation
of the greenback’s eventual appreciation in terms of gold. Thus, the expected effective yield on such investments was
high but primarily reflected a large expected capital gain rather than interest payments. Strictly speaking, the argument
of Friedman and Schwartz seems to apply more readily to investments in U.S. government bonds rather than in money
market securities that have short duration.
Another theoretical explanation has been proposed by Calomiris (1988), who rejects the capital flow argument of
Friedman and Schwartz and builds upon the original descriptive analysis of Mitchell. In Calomiris’ model, expecta-
tions about the resumption of specie payments imply expected future values of the exchange rate and the aggregate
price level. Government money-supply policy effectively pegs the nominal rate of interest and the equilibrium rate of
expected inflation. The terminal condition for the price level on the resumption date together with the equilibrium rate
of inflation determine a unique path of the price level recursively. The nominal money stock adjusts endogenously
(through the issue of national bank notes, the creation of bank deposits, and gold flows) to the level demanded given
the nominal interest rate and the price level.5 Thus, if the assumptions underlying Calomiris’ model are valid, actual
3Even if one were to exclude from the computation of this average abnormally high and potentially unreliable quotations during the Gold Corner
of 1869 and the Panic of 1873, the average rate would still have increased to 7.6%.
4The assumed risk-free rate of 5% likely represents an accurate approximation to the true risk-free rate. British consols, which were the safest
financial asset of the period, yielded roughly 3%, and historical evidence suggests that the best quality American financial securities commanded
a premium of about 2% over comparable British securities (Field, 1983, pp. 420-421). An estimate for the American risk-free rate is obtained by
summing the British consols’ yield and this premium.
5More specifically, the supply of money is perfectly elastic (see Calomiris, 1988, Figure 4 on p. 217).
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nominal interest rates are consistent with rational expectations in the sense that the interest rate corresponds to the
outcome of an equilibrium determined by the resumption expectations, which eventually turned out to be correct.
A critical assumption in Calomiris’ model is absence of arbitrage opportunities in the financial market (Calomiris,
1988, pp. 195, 199).6 This assumption is the cornerstone of modern asset pricing theory (e.g., Black and Scholes,
1973; Harrison and Kreps, 1979; Harrison and Pliska, 1981), but its applicability to financial markets of the nineteenth
century has been contested. In particular, a well known paper on the nineteenth-century American and British tech-
nology argues that arbitrage opportunities systematically emerged in the American economy and international capital
flows reflected arbitrage activities of foreign investors (Field, 1983, p. 422). The possibility that the nineteenth-century
financial market in New York City was inefficient is also raised by Michie (1986) in his analysis of institutional as-
pects of the London and New York stock exchanges. He finds that trading rules in New York tended to discourage
speculative operations and may have prevented the financial market from operating efficiently (Michie, 1986, pp. 176,
181).
Several empirical studies have examined the issue of arbitrage in the context of the operation of the gold standard in
the late nineteenth century. Clark (1984) argues that the gold points were often violated and arising profit opportunities
were not eliminated quickly. However, Officer (1986) identifies flaws in Clark’s methodology and shows that there
were few gold point violations and they did not persist. Although these studies do not address the question of whether
unexploited arbitrage opportunities existed during the Greenback Era, they indicate the need to rigorously test for the
presence of arbitrage rather than rule it out a priori.
The objective of this paper is to examine the Greenback Era return series, focusing explicitly on the critical issue
of whether the money market admitted arbitrage opportunities. The analysis sheds further light on the nature of the
interest rate paradox and helps to evaluate which of the two competing theories – the resumption expectations model
of Calomiris or the capital flow argument of Friedman and Schwartz – is better suited to explain the paradox. More
specifically, the paper uses tools of modern asset pricing theory to develop a methodology for identifying the presence
of unexploited arbitrage opportunities in financial data. Besides a few mild technical conditions necessary to apply the
theory, the only substantive economic assumption imposed here is one of frictionless markets: money market investors
are allowed to sell assets short and transaction fees are negligibly small. The essence of the developed methodology
is to provide a convenient way to aggregate the data by constructing a series of realizations of a scalar stochastic
discount factor (Cochrane, 2001, pp. 8-9). The market admits no arbitrage opportunities if and only if there exists a
positive stochastic discount factor, and checking positivity of corresponding realizations is straightforward.
Applying the methodology to the financial data from the Greenback Era, the paper finds that the observable return
series strongly suggest that, except possibly around the times of major market shocks such as the Gold Corner of
1869 and the Panic of 1873, the money market of the period did not admit arbitrage opportunities on a systematic
basis. This result complements the findings of Calomiris and others that the gold market of the Greenback Era was
efficient and suggests that an overall description of the American financial market of the second half of the nineteenth
century as a market with no systematic arbitrage opportunities is more appropriate than the description proposed by
Field (1983). Moreover, the result implies that the resumption expectations model of Calomiris likely provides a more
plausible explanation of the interest rate paradox than the capital flow argument of Friedman and Schwartz.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the methodology. Section 3 describes the data series.
Section 4 applies the methodology to the data and discusses the results. Section 5 concludes.
2. Methodology
This section begins by discussing the substantive economic assumptions underlying the analysis. It then introduces
the notation used in the paper, outlines the relevant theory, and describes the methodology for testing of whether
unexploited arbitrage opportunities are present in financial data.
6Calomiris argues that the gold market during the Greenback Era was efficient in the sense that the series of gold prices “is probably best
described as a random walk” (p. 203). However, he does not check whether the money market or financial market, as a whole, admitted arbitrage
when investment strategies involving assets other than gold are taken into account.
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2.1. Assumptions
Most importantly, the money market of the Greenback Era is viewed here as a frictionless market in the sense
that (1) the investors can sell assets short and (2) transaction fees are negligibly small. The first condition effectively
means that borrowing to finance speculative operations is allowed, for which there is supporting historical evidence,
except in the aftermath of the Gold Corner of 1869 and the Panic of 1873, when regular financial transactions virtually
ceased. The reason for the second condition is more technical. It is needed to rule out nonlinear pricing, which would
arise from scale economies if transaction fees are present. The condition should approximately hold in the context of a
money market, because most transactions on it occur between banks, who traditionally do not charge each other fees,
while transactions involving nonbanking institutions such as, for example, a sale of commercial paper by a business
firm are typically conducted in large volume, making any nonlinearities arising from brokerage fees negligibly small.
In addition, the money market investors of the Greenback Era are assumed to strictly prefer more wealth to less.
This restriction of strictly – rather than weakly – insatiable preferences is technical and is related to the strict positivity
of a linear pricing operator (Harrison and Kreps, 1979, pp. 384-387). It likely adequately represents reality, because
money market investors are usually professionals who trade for profit. Notably, in contrast to Calomiris (1988), the
investors are not required to be risk neutral. In fact, no specific assumption about risk attitudes needs to be imposed
at all. Also, unlike in the model of Calomiris, this paper does not take a stance on how resumption expectations
may affect the aggregate price level. No specific assumptions as to whether the aggregate price level is flexible or
predetermined are imposed here.
2.2. Price and return processes
Let t index calendar months starting with some initial month t0, which represents January 1857 in the empirical
application, as explained in Section 3. For each month t, denote by t′ the third consecutive month after t. This choice
is motivated by a typical time to maturity of money market securities, so that realizations of return processes can be
computed with minimum interpolation.
All of the following price and return processes refer to quotations in New York City, except as noted otherwise.
Let {gt}t≥t0 stand for the price process of one gold dollar quoted in legal tender currency. Specifically, before the
suspension of specie payments in December 1861 and after their resumption in January 1879, gt represents the price
of one gold dollar at the beginning of month t in terms of gold dollars, gt ≡ 1. During the Greenback era, gt is the
price of one gold dollar in terms of greenbacks. Observe that since the gold dollar can be used as a means of payment,
the inequality gt ≥ 1 always holds.
Next, let
{
1 + i1t,t′
}
t≥t0 stand for the nominal gross return process of the call loan index,
7 where i1t,t′ represents the
net amount payable at t′ on one dollar invested in the index at t. Likewise, let
{
1 + i2t,t′
}
t≥t0 be the nominal gross
return process of the commercial paper index. Given the findings of Sushka and Barrett (1984) on the integration of
the national capital market, the New York money market investors must also be allowed to (potentially) trade in the
Boston bankable paper index. Its nominal gross return process is denoted as
{
1 + i3t,t′
}
t≥t0 .
Furthermore, since there is historical evidence that gold flows between the U.S. and the U.K. responded to changes
in interest rates, the New York traders must be additionally allowed to invest in British money market securities. Let{
1 + i£t,t′
}
t≥t0 be the nominal gross return process of the London banker’s bill index defined in terms of the British
pound. Following the literature (e.g., Kindahl, 1961; Friedman and Schwartz, 1963), the dollar-pound spot exchange
rate is approximated as 4.8665 · gt legal tender dollars per £1, where 4.8665 is the mint ratio of the gold dollar to the
pound (the U.K. was on the gold standard throughout the period). Then, the same process defined in terms of legal
tender dollars is
{
gt′
gt
(
1 + i£t,t′
)}
t≥t0 .
For convenience, all gross returns are arranged in one vector as:
xt,t′ =
(
1 + i1t,t′ , 1 + i
2
t,t′ , 1 + i
3
t,t′ ,
gt′
gt
(
1 + i£t,t′
))′
.
7This paper uses indices rather than specific assets, because available return data are in the form of monthly averages of quotations for a mix
of securities from a given asset class. Implicitly, index investing presumes that a trader is able to diversify his or her portfolio. Historical evidence
supports this assumption. For example, banks of the Greenback Era usually held highly diversified call loan portfolios and gradually retired older
loans when making new ones.
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Finally, let {S t}t≥t0 be the railroad stock price process, where S t is the value of the railroad stock index at t. This
process will be used to check validity of the constructed stochastic discount factor.
2.3. Arbitrage and stochastic discount factor
Formally, an arbitrage opportunity is an investment strategy with the following three features. First, the strategy
has zero cost in the sense that any asset purchases are financed by borrowing. Second, it never results in a loss,
although it might be worthless at maturity. Third, it has a strictly positive expected payoff. Absence of unexploited
arbitrage opportunities in the money market implies existence of specific relationships in financial data, as explained
below.
Let
(
Ω,F , {Ft}t≥t0 , P
)
be a filtered probability space, where Ω is the set of states of the world, filtration {Ft}t≥t0
represents the evolution of information available to investors at the beginning of each month, σ-field F is interpreted
as F = ⋃
t≥t0
Ft, and P is the objective probability measure.8 The price and return processes are assumed to be adapted
to the filtration, so that for every t, the prices gt and S t are measurable with respect to Ft, while the vector of gross
returns xt,t′ is measurable with respect to Ft′ .
Under the imposed assumptions about frictionless trading and strictly insatiable preferences, by the first funda-
mental theorem of asset pricing (see Harrison and Kreps, 1979; Harrison and Pliska, 1981), the money market admits
no arbitrage if and only if there exists a probability measure P∗ such that (1) measures P and P∗ are equivalent and
(2) the prices of all securities discounted by an almost surely positive price of a numeraire asset are martingales under
P∗. Observe that since the inequality gt ≥ 1 always holds, gt is almost surely positive. Also, recall that it costs one
dollar at t to purchase any gross return payable at t′. Then, using the gold dollar as the numeraire asset, the theorem
implies that:
E∗
[
1
gt′
· xt,t′ |Ft
]
=
1
gt
· 1 for every t, (1)
where E∗ [·|Ft] is the conditional expectation under P∗ given the information represented by Ft and 1 is the vector of
ones having the same dimension as xt,t′ .
By a well known result, there exists an almost surely positive Radon-Nikodym derivative associated with P∗,
denoted below as a random variable ζt′ , that allows to change measures in (1) from P∗ to P:
E
[
ζt′
gt′
· xt,t′ |Ft
]
=
1
gt
· 1, (2)
where E [·|Ft] is the conditional expectation under P given Ft.
Rearranging (2):
E
[Mt,t′ · xt,t′ |Ft] = 1, (3)
whereMt,t′ ≡ gtζt′gt′ is an almost surely positive random variable that is commonly known in the finance literature as
the stochastic discount factor (e.g., Cochrane, 2001, pp. 8-9).
Applying E
[·|Ft0 ] to both sides of (3), by the law of iterated expectations:
E0
[Mt,t′ · xt,t′ ] = 1, (4)
where E0 [·] ≡ E [·|Ft0 ] for brevity.
Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) and Cochrane (2001) propose a particularly convenient representation ofMt,t′ as
an affine function of the shocks to the returns, Mt,t′ = E0Mt,t′ + (xt,t′ − E0xt,t′)′ b, where b is a vector of constants
such that (4) holds. Solving for b:
Mt,t′ = E0Mt,t′ + [1 − E0Mt,t′ · E0xt,t′ ]′ Σ−1t (xt,t′ − E0xt,t′) , (5)
where Σt = E0
(
xt,t′ − E0xt,t′) (xt,t′ − E0xt,t′)′ is the covariance matrix of the gross returns.
When markets are incomplete, Mt,t′ need not be unique. However, to rule out arbitrage, it is sufficient to find
one strictly positive stochastic discount factor that prices the assets (Harrison and Kreps, 1979, Corollary on p. 392).
Thus, the essence of this paper’s methodological approach is to compute realizations of the stochastic discount factor
(5) and check whether they are positive.
8This discussion is intended for interested readers. Others may want to skip the formalism and proceed to the stochastic discount factor
representation (5) on p. 5.
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2.4. Empirical strategy
If E0xt,t′ , Σt, and E0Mt,t′ in (5) were known, computing a realization of the stochastic discount factorMt,t′ would
be straightforward, because the only other variable in (5), vector xt,t′ , is a recorded realization of the gross returns.
Under mild assumptions, it is possible to estimate E0xt,t′ and Σt. To simplify the notation, the gross returns are
denoted more compactly as I1t,t′ , I
2
t,t′ , I
3
t,t′ , and I
4
t,t′ , where I
i
t,t′ = 1 + i
i
t,t′ for i = 1, 2, 3 and I
4
t,t′ =
gt′
gt
(
1 + i£t,t′
)
, so that
xt,t′ =
(
I1t,t′ , I
2
t,t′ , I
3
t,t′ , I
4
t,t′
)′
. Let the sample size be T and average gross returns be denoted as I1T , I
2
T , I
3
T , and I
4
T , where
IiT =
1
T
∑T
t=t0 I
i
t,t′ for every i. Then, define vectors mt and µt as:
mt =
(
x′t,t′ ,
[
I1t,t′ − I1T
]2
,
[
I1t,t′ − I1T
] [
I2t,t′ − I2T
]
,
[
I1t,t′ − I1T
] [
I3t,t′ − I3T
]
,
[
I1t,t′ − I1T
] [
I4t,t′ − I4T
]
,
[
I2t,t′ − I2T
]2
,[
I2t,t′ − I2T
] [
I3t,t′ − I3T
]
,
[
I2t,t′ − I2T
] [
I4t,t′ − I4T
]
,
[
I3t,t′ − I3T
]2
,
[
I3t,t′ − I3T
] [
I4t,t′ − I4T
]
,
[
I4t,t′ − I4T
]2)′
,
µt =
(
E0x′t,t′ ,Σ
1,1
t ,Σ
1,2
t ,Σ
1,3
t ,Σ
1,4
t ,Σ
2,2
t ,Σ
2,3
t ,Σ
2,4
t ,Σ
3,3
t ,Σ
3,4
t ,Σ
4,4
t
)′
,
where the last ten elements in µt represent the upper triangle of Σt in a vectorized form.
In line with assumptions commonly imposed on asset returns in the finance literature (e.g., Cochrane, 2001, p.
11), suppose that the gross return process
{
xt,t′
}
t≥t0 is ergodic stationary. Because the sample data span a time period
that is only slightly longer than two decades (see Section 3), it is not possible to ascertain stationarity of the return
series. However, augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (Hamilton, 1994, pp. 516-530) suggest that the series are covariance
stationary.
Ergodic stationarity implies that E0xt,t′ is the same vector and Σt is the same matrix across t, so that the subscript
t on E0xt,t′ , Σt, and µt can be dropped: E0xt,t′ = E0x, Σt = Σ, and µt = µ.9 Moreover, defining the average of mt’s as
mT , the law of large numbers (Hayashi, 2000, pp. 101-102) implies that:
mT ≡ 1T
T∑
t=t0
mt →p µ. (6)
Assuming that Gordin’s condition (Hayashi, 2000, p. 405) also holds, the central limit theorem implies that:
√
T
(
mT − µ)→d N (0,S) , (7)
where S is the asymptotic covariance matrix.
The empirical application employs the Newey-West estimator of S that is robust to heteroscedasticity and auto-
correlation up to 2 lags:
Sˆ = Γˆ0 +
2
3
(
Γˆ1 + Γˆ
′
1
)
+
1
3
(
Γˆ2 + Γˆ
′
2
)
, (8)
where Γˆv = 1T
∑T
t=t0+v
(
mt −mT ) (mt−v −mT )′ for v = 0, 1, 2.
Together, (6), (7), and (8) provide a way to consistently estimate the expected value of the returns and their
covariance matrix, as well as to conduct valid statistical inference.
In contrast to E0xt,t′ and Σt, the expected value of the stochastic discount factor, E0Mt,t′ , cannot be estimated from
the available data. However, as is well known from the finance theory, this expected value is simply the inverse of the
gross risk-free return, E0Mt,t′ =
[
1 + r ft,t′
]−1
, where r ft,t′ represents the net amount payable (for sure) at t
′ on one legal
tender dollar invested in the risk-free asset at time t.
In the empirical application, the annual risk-free rate is set to 5%, which is obtained by adding a 2% premium to
the approximate average yield of 3% on British consols (see footnote 4). An analysis of the robustness of the results
to this assumption is performed in Section 4.
9An analysis of the robustness of the results to this restriction is provided in Section 4.
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Lastly, it is worth noting that if the financial market admits no arbitrage, a properly constructed stochastic discount
factor must be able to price not only the four money market indices above, but also other assets including the railroad
stock index, which implies that:
E0
[
Mt,t′ S t′S t − 1
]
= 0. (9)
Now, suppose that
{
Mˆt,t′
}T
t=t0
are realizations of a valid stochastic discount factor. Given (9), the sample average
1
T
∑T
t=t0
[
Mˆt,t′ S t′S t − 1
]
must be statistically zero. Reinterpreting mt and µ in (6), (7), and (8) as (scalar) mt = Mˆt,t′ S t′S t −1
and µ = 0, the central limit theorem (7) leads to a formal test, provided that ergodic stationarity and Gordin’s condition
hold, as explained earlier. Specifically, the null hypothesis thatMt,t′ constructed according to (5) is a valid stochastic
discount factor can be tested using a test statistic Q = Tm′T Sˆ−1mT , since under the null, Tm
′
T Sˆ−1mT →d χ2 (1) .
3. Data
The data series employed in this paper come from Macaulay (1938), as well as other sources discussed below.
They run on a monthly basis, starting in January 1857, and are in the form of monthly averages of quotations in New
York City, except as noted otherwise. The last month is December 1879. Thus, the sample comprises 276 consecutive
months (T = 276).
Several comments about the return series and data summary statistics presented in Table 1 are in order. A typical
call loan during the Greenback Era required a collateral in the form of stocks and bonds, usually worth 130% of
the loan amount. As a rule, such loans were extended by banks to stock and bond brokers to finance speculative
operations or distribution of new securities. The loans were callable by lenders at any time, in which case borrowers
were expected to return the money within a day. Historical evidence suggests that banks operated diversified rolling
portfolios of loans by gradually retiring older loans and arranging for new ones in order to adjust reserves to desired
levels. As shown in Table 1, call loans on average commanded a rate of 6%. The maximum quotation of 61% was
recorded during the Panic of 1873 in September 1873. Relatively low rates, including the minimum quotation of 1.7%
in August 1876, are characteristic of the recessionary years 1874 to 1878.
The term “commercial paper” was generically applied to promissory notes on which merchants and manufacturers
borrowed funds short-term for use in the ordinary course of business. Such loans had a typical maturity of 60 to 90
days and, unlike call loans, did not require collateral. Each commercial paper issue was accompanied by a financial
statement of the borrower, and historical evidence suggests that only companies with good or excellent credit histories
were able to draw regularly on the commercial paper market. As can be seen, commercial paper commanded a small
premium over call loans with the average rate being almost 7%. The minimum rate of 3.6% was recorded in August
1876 and July 1878, and a historical maximum at 24% occurred during the Panic of 1857. The rates in the aftermath
of the Panic of 1873 (not shown in the table) were also high, ranging from 14% to 16.5%. Thus, the pattern of the
commercial paper returns follows the one on call loans.
A novel empirical feature of this research is the use of the return series for first-class bankable paper in Boston.
The series comes from Martin (1898), a comprehensive source of historical data on the Boston stock and money
markets, which appears to have been overlooked in the literature. The term “first-class bankable paper” refers to
high grade bank-endorsed promissory notes with a typical maturity of 90 to 180 days. For every month in the sample,
Martin either lists one prevalent rate on the paper during the corresponding month or provides a range of the respective
rate quotations (e.g., 9 to 10% in January 1857). In case a prevalent rate is listed, this rate is used as is. In case a range
of the quotations is provided, the midpoint of the range is used as an approximation to the relevant rate (e.g., 9.5% in
January 1857).
As can be seen in Table 1, loans procured via the Boston first-class bankable paper on average commanded a
rate of 6.4%. The pattern of Boston’s rate resembles the one of New York’s quotations with some exceptions. For
example, the minimum rate of 3% was recorded in September 1858, when rates in New York were also low but not at a
historical minimum. Also, the rate in the aftermath of the Panic of 1873 (not shown in the table) was a relatively high
9%, but the corresponding rate spike was far less pronounced than in New York. However, similarly to commercial
paper in New York, a historical maximum at 30% occurred during the Panic of 1857.
The London banker’s bill series comes from the NBER macrohistory database (http://www.nber.org/macrohistory)
and represents a discount rate on drafts drawn in British pounds maturing in 90 days. Observe that the American
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returns are on average 2.5 to 3 percentage points higher than London’s rate. According to Field (1983), this positive
return difference is expected, because the U.S. had access to superior agricultural “technology” due to the country’s
relative land abundance, which resulted in a higher economy-wide interest/profit rate. It is also worth noting that in
comparison with the Boston paper rate series, London’s rate exhibits less correlation with the New York returns.
Daily gold dollar prices between 1862 and 1878 are obtained from Mitchell (1908) by averaging high and low
daily quotes. As can be seen, the gold dollar on average commanded a premium of 27 cents over the legal tender
greenback. The highest price, 2.80 greenbacks, was recorded on July 11th, 1864.10 In comparison, the high quote
on “Black Friday,” September 24th, 1869, was a much lower 1.62 greenbacks (not shown in the table), but the price
crashed by nearly 20% to 1.33 greenbacks on that day after the Treasury made public its plan to prevent the gold
“corner.”11
The last data series in Table 1, the railroad stock index, represents a weighted average of railroad stock prices
quoted in legal tender dollars, where the weight of a stock is the number of corresponding shares outstanding at the
beginning of each year. Macaulay (1938) made no attempt to correct for the change in the composition of the index
over the long run, as some publicly traded railroad companies went bankrupt and others entered the market. However,
in the context of the empirical application, which uses the three-month returns on the index, the gradual change in its
composition is only a minor nuisance.
4. Results
Figure 3 presents a time series of realizations of the stochastic discount factor Mt,t′ computed according to (5).
The figure refers to the baseline case, in which the annual risk-free rate is set to 5%, while the expected value E0xt,t′
and the covariance matrix Σt are computed using all sample data and are held fixed across t, under the assumption that
the return series are ergodic stationary. It additionally reports an approximate 90%-level confidence interval for each
realization ofMt,t′ , which is obtained by simulating realizations of mT from its approximate distribution, as implied
by (7). To facilitate the analysis, calendar months with negative realizations are separately listed in Table 2.
Notably, while performing a test of whether equation (9) holds, the value of the test statistic Q is found to be 0.01,
which is less than χ2.90 (1) = 2.71, supporting the hypothesis thatMt,t′ constructed according to (5) is, indeed, a valid
stochastic discount factor.
Now, as Figure 3 demonstrates, there is little evidence that the money market of the Greenback Era admitted
arbitrage opportunities on a systematic basis, except possibly during the months listed in Table 2.12 Realizations of
Mt,t′ are positive in a large majority of cases, and instances when an entire confidence interval is negative (15 months
overall) comprise less than 7% of the total 216 months of the Greenback Era. Moreover, focusing explicitly on the
timing of the negative realizations, it is easy to see that a predominant fraction of such cases pertain to a major market
disturbance such as, specifically, the Gold Corner of 1869 and the Panic of 1873.13 The very few remaining instances
that cannot be linked to the Gold Corner of 1869 or the Panic of 1873, such as, for example, October 1864, appear to
have been short-lived.
It is reasonable to ask if the above results are sensitive to the assumption about the value of the risk-free rate,
especially since this rate is the only input parameter not estimated from the data. To illustrate that the results are, in
fact, robust to the assumption, Figure 4 plots realizations ofMt,t′ for three different levels of the rate, namely, r f = 4%,
r f = 5% (the baseline case), and r f = 6%. To avoid clutter in the figure, confidence intervals are not reported. As can
be seen, the three series are similar and, importantly, are in close agreement as to the timing of negative realizations
ofMt,t′ (particularly, in the aftermath of the Gold Corner of 1869 and the Panic of 1873). Qualitatively, the results for
r f = 4% and r f = 5% are nearly identical. What may be less obvious from the figure is that increasing the risk-free
rate tends to dampen fluctuations of Mˆt,t′ , so that slightly fewer instances of negative realizations ofMt,t′ are detected
10The first half of 1864 was marked by a rapidly rising gold price. Eventually, the Congress intervened on June 17th by passing a bill to ban gold
trading on an open market. However, the bill was repealed on July 2nd in the wake of civil unrest in New York City.
11This event in U.S. financial history is commonly referred to as “the Gold Corner of 1869.”
12To show that a market admits no arbitrage it is sufficient to find just one strictly positive stochastic discount factor.
13In fact, the negative realizations ofMt,t′ in those two episodes should be viewed with some scepticism, because the corresponding computations
may be based on quotations from few actual transactions.
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in the case of r f = 6%. Although this result strengthens the conclusion that the money market did not systematically
admit arbitrage opportunities, the rate at 6% may be overstating the true risk-free rate.
Lastly, one may wonder if the results are robust to the restriction of the constant expected value E0xt,t′ and co-
variance matrix Σt across t, which is implied by the unverifiable assumption of ergodic stationarity. While a compre-
hensive analysis without imposing ergodic stationarity is difficult,14 to show that relaxing the restriction is unlikely
to qualitatively change the results, the realizations of Mt,t′ for r f = 5% were recalculated using only data between
months t0 and t − 1 to estimate each E0xt,t′ and Σt (so that the estimates vary with t). The series along with the
approximate 90%-level confidence intervals is plotted in Figure 5.
The new Mˆt,t′ series in Figure 5 tends to have more pronounced fluctuations than the baseline series (Figure 3).
Expectedly, as each E0xt,t′ and Σt is now estimated on a subsample of size less than T , the confidence intervals become
wider, which makes inferencing on Mt,t′ particularly difficult for early years of the Greenback Era. Nevertheless,
except in very few instances (e.g., December 1862 and April–June 1864), the new and baseline series closely agree
on the timing of negative realizations. Qualitatively, Figures 3 and 5 tell the same story that arbitrage opportunities
appear not to have been systematic and, if such opportunities ever existed, they only occurred during episodes of a
major financial market disturbance.
To summarize, the existing evidence strongly suggests that the money market of the Greenback Era did not admit
arbitrage opportunities on a systematic basis, except possibly around the times of major market shocks such as the
Gold Corner of 1869 and the Panic of 1873. While arbitrage opportunities in the few other instances cannot be
ruled out entirely, they were apparently short-lived. These results provide a verification of the critical “no arbitrage”
assumption of Calomiris (1988) that, in part, distinguishes his analysis from the conceptual framework adopted by
Friedman and Schwartz (1963). Thus, the resumption expectations model of Calomiris appears to provide a more
plausible explanation of the interest rate paradox than the capital flow argument of Friedman and Schwartz.
5. Conclusion
The paradox of low nominal interest rates amid rampant Civil War inflation and of relatively high rates during
prolonged deflation after the war is one of the most striking phenomena of the Greenback Era (1862-1878) in U.S.
financial history. The paradox had long been known to economic historians, but an adequate explanation eluded the
profession for many decades. The two leading competing theories – the resumption expectations model of Calomiris
(1988) and the capital flow argument of Friedman and Schwartz (1963) – provide different explanations of the paradox
and are irreconcilable because of their opposite approaches to the existence of unexploited arbitrage opportunities in
the financial market. Calomiris rules out such opportunities at the outset, while the explanation offered by Friedman
and Schwartz is, strictly speaking, valid only if the opportunities persisted, as first noted by Roll (1972).
This paper reinvestigates the interest rate paradox, focusing explicitly on the critical issue of whether the money
market of the Greenback Era admitted arbitrage opportunities. Knowledge of whether or not such opportunities existed
on a systematic basis is crucial for determining which of the two explanations of the paradox is more plausible. Also,
it helps shed further light on the hotly debated topic of efficiency of American financial markets of the nineteenth
century. The paper contributes to the literature by analyzing the behavior of short-term money market rates rather
than long-term bond yields, which have already been extensively studied, and by looking for evidence of arbitrage
opportunities in the interest rate data rather than performing a yet another analysis of gold market efficiency.
The paper has other novel features that distinguish it from the existing literature on the Greenback Era. Most
importantly, it uses mathematical tools of modern asset pricing theory to develop a methodology for identifying the
presence of unexploited arbitrage opportunities in financial data. The only substantive economic restriction is one
of frictionless markets in that the money market investors are allowed to sell assets short and transaction fees are
presumed to be negligibly small. Unlike in the prior research, no specific assumption is made here about attitudes of
the investors toward risk, they only must strictly prefer more wealth to less. Given that, the first fundamental theorem
of asset pricing implies that the absence of arbitrage opportunities is, effectively, equivalent to the existence of specific
data relationships, which can be verified. The essence of the methodology is providing a way to aggregate the data by
14If a series has an arbitrary form of time dependence, it is impossible to consistently estimate population moments from sample data, because
the law of large numbers is not guaranteed to hold.
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constructing a series of realizations of a stochastic discount factor having a particularly convenient form. Finding just
one positive stochastic discount factor is sufficient to rule out arbitrage, and checking positivity of the realizations of
the constructed discount factor is straightforward. A novel empirical aspect of the analysis is that it simultaneously
employs four different money market return series, one of which – the Boston first-class bankable paper series –
appears to have been overlooked in the prior research.
Applying the methodology, the paper finds that the observable return series strongly suggest that the money market
of the Greenback Era did not admit arbitrage on a systematic basis, except possibly around the times of major market
shocks such as the Gold Corner of 1869 and the Panic of 1873. While arbitrage opportunities in the few other
instances cannot be ruled out entirely, they were apparently short-lived. Additional analysis shows that this conclusion
is invariant to different assumptions about the value of the risk-free interest rate and suggests that the conclusion may
also be robust to relaxing the technical condition of ergodic stationarity.
These results complement the findings of Calomiris and others that the gold market of the Greenback Era was
efficient, suggesting that an overall description of the American financial market of the second half of the nineteenth
century as a market with no systematic arbitrage opportunities is more appropriate than the description proposed
by Field (1983). Moreover, they imply that the resumption expectations model of Calomiris likely provides a more
plausible explanation of the interest rate paradox than the capital flow argument of Friedman and Schwartz.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for price and return series
Data series Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Call loans, %a 6.15 4.63 1.70 61.23
Commercial paper, %a 6.85 2.31 3.60 24.00
Boston bankable paper, %a 6.43 2.57 3.00 30.00
London banker’s bills, %b 3.62 1.84 0.91 9.75
Gold dollar, greenbacksc 1.27 0.27 1.00 2.80
Railroad stock index, dollarsd 30.82 9.39 12.83 45.20
Notes: The table provides summary statistics for the price and return series used in the empirical analysis. All
summary statistics are computed using monthly data between January 1857 and December 1879, with the exception
of the gold dollar price series, in which case the statistics are computed using daily data from 1862 to 1878. The
data for the price and return series are taken from Martin (1898), Mitchell (1908), Macaulay (1938), and the NBER
macrohistory database (http://www.nber.org/macrohistory, last accessed on June 30, 2010).
aData series comprises net annualized percentage returns on loans made in legal tender dollars.
bData series comprises net annualized percentage returns on loans made in British pounds.
cData series comprises daily prices of one gold dollar in terms of greenbacks between 1862 and 1878 (a total of 5,170
data points).
dData series comprises values of the railroad stock index in legal tender dollars.
Table 2: Months with negative realizations of stochastic discount factor
Month Mˆt,t′ Month Mˆt,t′
September 1864 −0.39 November 1871∗ −0.52
October 1864∗ −0.82 December 1871∗ −0.47
March 1869 −0.13 September 1872 −0.31
April 1869∗ −0.35 October 1872∗ −1.35
July 1869∗ −0.50 November 1872∗ −1.95
August 1869∗ −0.57 January 1873∗ −0.38
October 1869∗ −0.97 February 1873 −0.12
November 1869∗ −1.36 March 1873 −0.18
December 1869∗ −0.73 October 1873∗ −3.83
January 1870 −0.35 November 1873∗ −3.28
October 1871 −0.21 December 1873∗ −0.44
Notes: The table lists calendar months with negative computed realizations of the stochastic discount factor (the Mˆt,t′
series) and the corresponding values of Mˆt,t′ for the baseline case, in which the risk-free rate is set to 5% and the
returns are assumed to be ergodic stationary.
∗The entire approximate 90%-level confidence interval for Mˆt,t′ is negative in this month.
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Figure 1: Wholesale price index (WPI).
Notes: The figure plots monthly values of the wholesale price index (WPI) in the U.S. from January 1861 to December 1878 (the base year of the
WPI is 1914). The data for the WPI are taken from the NBER macrohistory database (http://www.nber.org/macrohistory, last accessed on June 30,
2010).
Figure 2: Commercial paper rate, %.
Notes: The figure plots monthly averages of annualized commercial paper rate quotations in New York City from January 1861 to December 1878.
The data for the rate are taken from Macaulay (1938).
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Figure 3: Stochastic discount factor in baseline case.
Notes: The figure plots computed monthly realizations of the stochastic discount factor (the Mˆt,t′ series) and the corresponding approximate 90%-
level confidence intervals for the baseline case, in which the risk-free rate is set to 5% and the returns are assumed to be ergodic stationary. The
Mˆt,t′ series is represented by the solid black curve. The confidence intervals are represented by the shaded gray area.
Figure 4: Stochastic discount factor under different risk-free rates.
Notes: The figure plots computed monthly realizations of the stochastic discount factor (the Mˆt,t′ series) under different assumed values of the
risk-free rate (r f ). The case of r f at 4% is represented by the dotted curve. The case of r f at 5% is represented by the solid curve. The case of r f
at 6% is represented by the dashed curve. In each case, the returns are assumed to be ergodic stationary.
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Figure 5: Stochastic discount factor under time-varying return moments.
Notes: The figure plots computed monthly realizations of the stochastic discount factor (the Mˆt,t′ series) and the corresponding approximate 90%-
level confidence intervals for the case of time-varying return moments, when the assumption of the ergodic stationarity of the returns is relaxed.
The Mˆt,t′ series is represented by the solid black curve. The confidence intervals are represented by the shaded gray area.
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